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CURRENT LEGISLATION
As this country enters the initial stages of a war economy, American agri-
culture is just emerging from the havoc created by the last World War.
Basically its distress has been the result of over-exuberant production in the
face of a stable or well-supplied market.1 Its problems are nowhere more
acute than in the field of agricultural credit. During the first world war era,
farm mortgage indebtedness jumped from $3,200,000,000 to $10,702,000,000.2
Largely as the result of foreclosures and write-offs, that debt has been
reduced by approximately one-third. But even in 1940, 255 of this reduced
debt was either delinquent or had overdue payments extended. Within a
period of seven years, one-eighth of all farms under mortgage to the federal
land banks and Farm Mortgage Corporation were repossessed,4 and in the
single year 1939, the system acquired nearly 18,000 farms.5 A further
indication of the seriousness of the farm credit problem is the rapid growth
of farm tenancy. In 1935 approximately half of all farm families were
tenants,0 and the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy reported that the
number was increasing at the rate of 40,000 families a year.7 These con-
ditions are by-products in part of the unsatisfactory nature of the farm credit
system, which has been characterized by overlending in good times, and
foreclosures and insecurity in depression periods.8 If anything has been
demonstrated by the last war and the ensuing period of deflation, it is that
traditional credit concepts are insufficient to handle the credit problems of
agriculture.
With farm prices and land values again climbing toward inflation levels,
re-examination of the credit needs of American agriculture is appropriate.
An appraisal is therefore presented of the existing credit system in terms
of its past performance and capacity to meet the new strains of a war
economy and potential post-war deflation. Its scope includes evaluation of
1. See YEARBOOK OF AGIcuLrum (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 390-96.
2. The figures are for the years 1910 and 1922 respectively. See Torgersr.n, qri-
cultural Finance in the United States (1940) 16 J. Limn & P. U. Eco:';. 195.
3. See Hearigs before Subcommittee of Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 270 (hereafter cited Hearings on S. 3509).
4. See Hearings before Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8748, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940) 239.
5. (lay, 1941) 4 AGRic. FIN. REv., No. 1, tab. 8.
6. Of the 6,812,350 farm families in the United States in 1935, 2,,65,155, or 42 ,
were farm tenants. See YEAROOx OF AGRIcULTURE (U. S. Dept Agric. 1940) S31.
7. FAmia TENANCY, REPORT OF THE PRESMEmr's CoM'urrEE (1937). For a sum-
mary treatment of the farm tenancy problem, see YrxmaooK oF AGRxcuLTur (U. S.
Dep't Agric. 1940) 887-906. See generally Farm Tenancy (1937) 4 LA, & Coz.T2!IP.
PROB. 423-572.
S. See YEmmooK OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 752-54.
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the temporizing measures of the depression era and discussion of the possi-
bilities for revision of the long-term credit system. Since governmental
agencies are assuming increasing importance in the field of farm credit,"
the focus of investigation is on them. A successfully administered govern-
mental program, however, will point the way to the adoption of similar
policies by private institutional lenders,10 the traditional source of farm credit.
While short-term and intermediate-term credits are essential to the orderly
functioning of the farm economy, they are here only collaterally relevant.
The problems there involved are of a different nature from those of long-
term credit. Chiefly they are questions of management and attention to
details, rather than normative considerations of the principles upon which
the credit system is to operate.1" Moreover, existing agencies seem capable
of providing adequate short-term credit for the farmer.
12
APPRAISAL OF THE EXISTING CREDIT SYSTEM
The Mechanics of the Land Bank System. The Federal Farm Loan Act
of 191613 established a farm credit scheme patterned after the Landschaft
system of Germany.1 4 Its distinguishing features are the requirement that
each borrower guarantee the obligation of all other borrowers, t and the
provision for obtaining funds by the issuance of bonds, with the collective
value of the mortgages as security.' G To implement these principles, twelve
federal land bank districts have been established,1 7 and prospective borrowers
9. For statistics from 1910 to 1940 on total farm mortgage debt and amounts held
by selected lender groups, see 25 THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION (Bur. of Agric. Econ.,
U. S. Dep't Agric., May, 1941) 12.
10. See EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (1940) 1.
11. See BENNER, THE FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT SYSTEMi (1926); YEARBOOK
OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 751-52.
12. See EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FARMI CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (1940)
59-99.
13. 39 STAT. 360 (1916), 12 U. S. C. § 641 (1940). The Act was declared consti-
tutional in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company, 255 U. S. 180 (1921). It
will hereafter be cited by section number only, except where the original provisions have
been significantly amended.
14. In 1913, President Wilsop appointed an American Commission, headed by Sen-
ator Duncan U. Fletcher, to investigate and report on cooperative land-mortgage banks,
rural credit unions and similar institutions in Europe. SEN. Doc. No. 214, 63d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1913) 3. For analysis of the German Landschajt system, see id. at 354-66.
15. In the European system, unlimited liability of borrowers was characteristic.
See WRIGHT, FARM MORTGAGE FINANCING (1923) 40. The land bank system adopted here
limits borrowers' liability to 5% of their own loan. § 9; 48 STAT. 271 (1933), 12 U. S. C.
§ 744a (1940). See Knox National Farm Loan Association v. Phillips, 300 U. S. 194
(1937).
16. Section 13 (subd. third). For this aspect of the Landschaft system, see WRIGHT,
loc. cit. supra note 15.
17. The original federal land bank districts were supplanted in 1937 by twelve farm
credit districts with identical boundaries. 50 STAT. 704, 707 (1937), 12 U. S. C. §§ 671,
640a (1940).
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are authorized to form National Farm Loan Associations within each district
to act as intermediaries of the land bank in making loans.1, Long-term loans
backed by mortgages are made by the land bank through the farm loan
associations. 9 Endorsed by the association as surety, the mortgages are sold
to the land bank of the district,20 and the bank is empowered to issue bunds
with the mortgages as security.2 ' Great stress is placed upon the cooperative
features of the system. Farmer-ownership and control is theoretically to lie
achieved by requiring each borrower to subscribe to stock in the farm loan
association in an amount equal to 5, of the principal of his loan.--- The
association must in turn subscribe to land bank stock in an amount ,lual
to 5% of the value of its mortgages held by the land bank.2 The stock of
borrowers is held by the association to absorb its losses, and stock of the
association is held by the land bank to provide a similar contingency fund
against association defaults.2 4 This elaborate mechanism was evolved in an
effort to create a system which would be responsive to the will of farmer-
borrowers. It was thought that by placing the borrower in the position of
a stockholder and by making him liable not only for his own loan, but for
the defaults of his fellow-borrowers, a high degree of interest in the operation
of the system would be fostered.2
Evaluation of the Existing Credit Systen. Inadequacies of the land bank
system which have become apparent during the past twenty-five years may
in part be attributed to the wide variance in agricultural conditions between
this country and Europe where the principles of the system were developed.
The farm economy of continental Europe is based upon an immobile peasant
class operating family-sized farms on a self-sustaining basis. This country,
on the other hand, has developed commercialized and mechanized agricul-
ture -G with a consequent multiplication of credit needs.2 7 And instead of
18. Section 7. As of December 31, 1939, there were 3,722 operating national farm
loan associations. See SEVENTH ANNUAL REORT OF THE FAMur CRFL11T ArDIInsm%-
TIoN (1939) 31-32.
19. Sections 9, 12, 13 (subd. seeond).
20. Section 11 (subds. first. second).
21. Section 13 (subds. first, third).
22. Section 8.
23. Section 7.
24. Sections 7, 8.
25. See 53 CONG. Rac. 453-55 (1916). Even at the time the original bill was passed,
grave doubts of the wisdom of the stock subscription requirement were expressed in
Congress. See Hearings before Comnnittec on Agriculture on H. R. 8748, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) 248-49.
26. Commercialization and specialization have been the necessary compliments in
agriculture to the factory system and mass production in industry. For a discussion oi
the influence of technical progress on agricultural production, see Yrr-oo oF Acnz-
cutTuRE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 509-32.
27. In 1900 the average farming operation might have been undertaken with an in-
vestment of $3,000; in 1930 the amount of capital required for this purpose vas about
$ 8,000. See id. at 743.
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operating under the reasonably stable weather and price conditions prevailing
in Europe, agriculture in the United States has been exposed to cyclical
changes in weather 28 and drastic fluctuations in prices.20 These factors have
placed strains upon the credit structure which it was not designed to bear.
One of the principal specific weaknesses of the system results from the
concentration of the burden of losses on too small a group.30 The national
farm loan associations which attempt to absorb their losses by charging
them off against the stock subscriptions of their member-borrowers break
*down in a period of agricultural stress. In 1940, the capital of 60% of
the associations was so badly impaired through losses that they could not
make new loans. 3L Of the associations organized since 1933, 20o have
suffered such severe losses that they are no longer able to function.32 In
the St. Paul district, the area most affected by the drought, 81.8% of the
associations can no longer make loans.33 But this condition is not confined
to disaster areas. The percentage is even higher in the comparatively favor-
able area serviced by the Baltimore bank, and nearly as high in the New
Orleans district.34 Attempts to alleviate the situation by the use of coni-
partments within an insolvent association,"3 through which new borrowers
may secure loans without becoming liable for losses previously incurred by
the association, have been of doubtful value. The interest rate on such loans
is one-fourth of one percent higher than the usual rate,30 and even with
28. An exhaustive study of climate and agriculture is contained in the YEARBnOOK OF
AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1941). See particularly id. at 685-99. See also Hear-
ings before Coindtee on Agriculture on H. R. 8748, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 249.
29. See YE.ARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 386; HANID00K OF
EcoNomic INFORMATION ON THE USE OF FAwt CREDIT (U. S. Farm Credit Adm'n) 3.
For an analysis of current price tendencies, see 25 THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION (Bur. of
Agric. Econ., U. S. Dep't Agric., July, 1941) 9-12; 25 TuE AGPCULTURAL SrrUATION
(Bur. of Agric. Econ., U. S. Dep't Agric., Oct., 1941) 5-8.
30. This fact was emphasized by the' Secretary of Agriculture in his testimony on
the Farm Credit Act of 1940. Hearings. on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 271-74.
31. See id. at 9. For more specific statistics, see Hearings before Coinsnltec on Agri-
culture on H. R. 8748, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 18.
32. Statistics are for the year 1940. See Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1940) 272.
33. See ibid.
34. 85.7% of the associations in the Baltimore district were so badly impaired in
1940 that they could not make loans, and in the New Orleans district the percentage
was 66.4. See ibid.
35. This expedient was adopted in the Farm Credit Act of 1937. Loans are made
directly to the borrower by the land bank until there are at least ten such borrowers
with loans aggregating not less than $20,000. A compartment in the farm loan assoia-
tion is then formed for the new borrowers. 50 STAT. 711 (1937), 12 U. S. C. § 724 (1940).
Approximately 860 such compartments have been organized. Hearings on S. 3509, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 205.
36.' This rate is still one-fourth of one percent less than that on direct loans made by
the land banks. 48 STAT. 44 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 723(b) (1940); 50 STAT. 711 (1937),
12 U. S. C. § 724 (1940).
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this expedient, 35%o of the associations are unable to operate3 7 'Moreover,
since the associations hold stock in the land bank, banks have been reluctant
to shift resources to bolster the weaker associations for fear that the action
would be held a preferential dividend.38 With each unit of the system thus
left to absorb its own losses, the resistance of the organization as a whole
is undermined.
Another developmental imperfection in the present credit structure is its
failure to function as a cooperative system. The stock subscription require-
ment, which was designed to stimulate interest of borrowers in the organi-
zation and insure farmer-ownership and control, has operated only as an
additional commission for the loan. Losses are so severe in many cases
that they consume the entire value of the stock. Instead of getting dividends,
the borrower pays interest on his shares, since they are nonually bought
with part of the proceeds of his loan. The stock is in fact a liability rather
than an asset, a condition which is reflected in the disinterest of borrowers
in stockholder activities. Only 18%, of the borrowers attend stockholder
meetings, 39 and 20 to 30% of the stock originally accompanying the loans is
now held by outsiders.40 The typical attitude of the borrower, once he has
obtained his loan, is one of indifference to the operation of the system until
his obligation matures. And not only inclinations but also opportunities for
control are limited. The borrower elects none of the directors of the land
bank of the district. He has power to vote only for directors of the local
farm loan association,"' who in turn elect one of seven directors of the land
bank.4 And this indirect method of control is further attenuated by the
requirement that salaries paid to association directors be first approved by
the Farm Credit Administration.43 In practice stockholder-borrowers also
have little power over the important functional controls in the credit system.
37. See Hcarings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 205, 272.
38. Generally stockholders are entitled to participate equally in the distribution of nct
profits, unless otherwise provided by the terms of their contract with the corporation.
See Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 65.
39. Recently efforts have been made t, increase stockholder-borrower participatitn
by publicity campaigns and inducements tv attend stockholder meetings, but there has
been no marked increase in interest. See Hicarings on S. 3509, 76th Cwng., 3d Sess.
(1940) 167-68.
40. This has resulted from transfers or sales of the property where the purchaser
has refused to take the stock or refused to pay anything for it. See id. at 10. In the Fed-
eral Farm Loan Act, it is specifically stated that no persons except borrowers on farm
land mortgages shall be members or shareholders of national farm loan associations. § 8.
41. Section 7 as amended, 50 STAT. 710 (1937), 12 U. S. C. §712 (1940).
42. 50 STAT. 704 (1937), 12 U. S. C. § 640(b) (1940). The associations of the
district also nominate candidates for a district director, and from the three highest nom-
inees the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration appoints one as district director.
Ibid., 12 U. S. C. at § 640(d).
43. Section 7 as amended by ExEc. ORDER Ku. 6a084 (March 27, 1933), 12 U. S. C.
§713 (1940).
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Ultimate authority on loan values rests with the land bank appraiser, 44 and
discretion in regard to foreclosure and lending policies is vested in the board
of directors of the land bank,45 despite the fact that losses on foreclosures
and write-offs must be borne by the farm loan associations and their bor-
rowers.
A fuuther defect in the present credit structure arises out of the annual
Government subsidy required to maintain a reasonably low rate of interest
on loans. The Federal Farm Loan Act established as the minimum rate
on loans the interest rate in the last series of farm loan bonds issued by the
land bank prior to making the loan, plus one percent for administrative
expenses and losses.46 Rates on loans have varied between 49 and 5%'0,
depending on the amount of interest required of the land banks on their
bonds.47 Thus, to enable the banks to provide an effective rate of 33122
to the borrower, annual interest subsidies to the land banks of approximately
$36,500,000 have been needed. 48 Between 1933 and 1940, the United States
Treasury paid a total of $196,274,421 to the land banks for this purpose.40
Yet an even larger subsidy would have been required had not the Govern-
ment, by an indirect guarantee of land bank bonds, enabled the banks to
obtain funds at lower interest costs. Investors have purchased the bonds
at lower rates in reliance on continuing Government support of the land bank
credit structure. The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation has been author-
44. Each farm loan association has a loan committee which investigates the character
and solvency of loan applicants and the sufficiency of the security, but no loan may be
made without favorable report by the land bank appraiser. § 10 as amended, 41 STAT.
570 (1920), 12 U. S. C. §§751-53 (1940).
45. Section 13 as amended by 47 STAT. 14, 1548 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 781. See
Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Lee, 174 Miss. 774, 165 So. 613 (1936); Fed-
eral Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth, 218 Iowa 339, 252 N. W. 507 (1934). It has
frequently been alleged that bondholder committees are an influential factor in deter-
mining land bank credit policies. See Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
171.
46. Section 12 (subds. second, third). The maximum rate was set at 6%, exclusive
of amortization payments. See ibid.
47. The interest rate written in the mortgage contract for new loans made through
unimpaired national farm loan associations in 1940 was 4%; the rate through associa-
tions whose stock had become impaired was 4y4%; for loans made directly by the
banks it was 4Y2%. See EIGHTH ANNUAL RF'oRT OF FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
(1940) 24. Loans by the Land Bank Commissioner are written to bear interest at the
rate of 5% a year. See id. at 52.
48. See Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 13. The Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act provided that for a five-year period beginning July 11, 1933, the rate of
interest charged borrowers should be reduced to 4yz%. 48 STAT. 43 (1933), 12 U. S. C.
§ 771 (1940). In 1935 this rate was reduced to 3Y% for a one-year period, but it has
been extended until July 1942. 49 STAT. 314 (1935), 54 STAT. 684 (1940), 12 U. S. C.
§ 771 (subd. twelfth) (1940).
49. See EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (1940) app.,
tab. 22.
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ized to purchase the bonds, 0 and the Treasury has been empowered to make
up land bank deficiencies.' 1 This arrangement does not, however, produce
the low rate of interest which would come from an outright guarantee of the
bonds. And the lower rates resulting from subsidies have been achieved only
at great public expense.
Perhaps the definitive flaw in the present credit system grows olit of its
appraisal and lending policy. By the terms of the Federal Farm Loan Act
loans are to be made up to 50% of the value of the land mortgaged and
20% of the value of the permanent insured improvements thereonY2 The
value of the land for agricultural purposes is the basis of appraisal, and the
earning power of the farm is a principal factor.r In practice, however, this
standard has been tortured to include factors totally unrelated to the earning
power of the farm. As "things which must be considered," the present
appraisal manual cites the earning power of the farm based on representa-
tive management and normal prices for farm products; its home desirability;
the various other factors which affect farm value such as type of farming,
adaptability to diversification, location, hazards involved, the agricultural
development of the area, and general desirability of the property; and normal
agricultural value, present market value, normal market value, recovery value,
commercial or special purpose value, speculative value, and prudent invest-
ment value.5
The standard is so complex as to be no standard at all, and in actual
practice its effect has been to focus the attention of both lender and borrower
upon the market value or per acre value of the farm as collateral security
for the loan. The weaknesses of this approach have become increasingly
apparent. It subjects the lending scheme to a variety of inflationary and
deflationary forces which inure to the detriment of both borrower and lender.
In a period of rising prices for farm products and farm real estate, over-
lending is the normal result. 5 During periods of low prices, when farm
50. The land banks were authorized in 1933 to issue up to 2,000,000,00f0 of Govern-
ment-guaranteed bonds for purposes of making new loans, or for purchasing mortgages.
48 STAT. 41 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §992 (1940). When the Federal Farm Mortgage Cor-
poration was formed, it was given power to purchase farm loan bonds, and authority to
issue guaranteed obligations was transferred to it. 48 STAT. 345, 346, 12 U. S. C. §§ q92a,
1020c (1940).
51. Government subscriptions to the paid-in surplus of the land banks equal to the
amount of the extensions and deferments granted by the banks were authorized in 1933.
48 STAT. 43 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 781 (subd. tenth) (1940). Subscriptions to paid-in
surplus by the Secretary of the Treasury from 1933 to 1940 totaled $S%,274,421. See
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATIx.N (1940) app., tali. 22.
52. Section 12 (subd. fifth).
53. Ibid.
54. A MANUAL OF APPRAISING FOR USE BY NATIONAL FARm LOA .A z4wimio
(Land Bank Div., Farm Credit Adm'n, 1940) 1-25.
55. The sequence of events is graphically traced in te HANDmaUcK OF ECO:;Xmlc
INFORMATION ON THE USE OF FARM CREDIT (U. S. Farm Credit Adm'n) 2, 3.
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income drops, the debt burden becomes unbearable."' Thus, in the early
thirties farm values dropped one-half and farm income two-thirds, but the
mortgage debt remained practically constant.57 As a result, interest charges
consumed approximately 35%o of cash income of mortgaged farms, forced
sales or foreclosures averaged 39.4% of all farm transfers,58 and widespread
refinancing and reamortization of mortgages became a necessity. The plain
fact is that valuation of the farm as collateral security is a concept foreign
to the purposes of the loan. The farmer does not borrow on the assumption
that his farm will subsequently be sold to repay the loan. He borrows on
the theory that he will repay the loan from the proceeds of his farming
operations, and if the loan is to be repaid from these proceeds, clearly its
amount should be governed by the earning capacity of the farm. This earning
capacity can best be determined by an examination of potential farm income.
To determine the loan value of the farm by reference to its sale value, per
acre value, or replacement cost of improvements is to insinuate irrelevant
criteria into the analysis. These indices may not reflect the value of the farm
as a producing agricultural unit, and loans based upon values so established
may be similarly out of line with the debt-carrying capacity of the farmn.5
TEMPORIZING CREDIT MEASURES OF THE DEPRESSION ERA
Deficiencies in the long-term credit system have been accentuated by the
past decade of deflation, but fundamentally they are not exclusively a de-
pression phenomenon. Credit problems are as much the result of years of
agricultural prosperity and expansion as of the ensuing economic stagnation,
and any solution of the problems must involve planning to encompass a
variety of agricultural conditions. With but few exceptions, 60 such long-
56. See ibid. The ratio of mortgage debt to value of land and buildings on 1,270,000
full-owner-operated farms was 29.1% in 1920, 39.6% in 1930, and 50.2 c, in 1935. See
Miscellaneous Publication No. 268 (U. S. Dep't Agric. Sept. 1938) 8. See Torgerson,
loc. cit. rupra note 2.
57. See Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 156. See also HAN'DBOOK
OF EcoNomic INFOR-MATION ON USE OF FARM CREDIT (U. S. Farm Credit Adm'n) 3.
58. See Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 158. Data from Circular
No. 354 (U. S. Dep't Agric., April, 1935).
59. Prices bid by outside investors may be the result of hedging against inflation,
or because the farm is near a developing suburban area, or for any number of reasons
unrelated to debt-carrying capacity of the farm. Land which in a half-century jumps
from a free homestead to a farm saleable at $250 an acre suggests a speculator's paradise.
See YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 891.
60. The Farm Credit Act of 1933 established the production credit corporations and
production credit associations as a permanent source of short-term credit for agriculture;
twelve district banks for cooperatives were also organized under the terms of this Act.
48 STAT. 257 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §§ 1131-31h, 1134-34m (1940). For a summary of
the long-term rehabilitation work now being carried on by the Farm Security Adminis-
tration, see REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
(U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 1-24.
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term planning has been lacking in recent credit legislation. Measures adopted
during the depression era were designed primarily to cushion the shock of
deflation on borrowers, rather than to provide a permanently satisfactory
credit structure.!1 The legislation proceeded along two somewhat different
lines: some measures were aimed at providing outright financial subsidies
for the farm debtor, others at liberalizing bankruptcy and moratorium laws.
Financial Subsidies for Farm Debtors. To support the farm credit struc-
ture Congress annually appropriated funds for interest subsidies to the land
banks, and contributed $196,274,421 to paid-in surplus of the system to
enable the banks to grant extensions on interest payments and deferments
of principal payments to worthy borrowers.62  In 1933, the Farm Credit
Administration was organized, and through the eleven credit agencies within
its surveillance $350,000,000 in subsidies to fanner-borrowers and creditors
were dispersed.63 In the same year the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
was authorized to make $200,000,000 available to the Land Bank Commis-
sioner for emergency loans,6 and Congress later established the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation with authority to issue Government-guaranteed
bonds up to $2,000,000,000 to secure funds for these emergency mortgage
loans.65
Much of this emergency legislation was for purposes of refinancing. The
principal beneficiaries were life insurance companies, who were bailed out
61. The creation and activities of federal credit agencies are discussed in Y&na.BoOK
cF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 745-49. Federal refinancing of mortgage
loans during the depression is analyzed in WVoonmtFF, FARaM MoRTaGAG Lo.\ts OF LIr'"
INSURANCE CoasAIES (1937) 138-56. Data on emergency mortgage loans made by
the Land Bank Commissioner is contained in the EIGnru ANNUAL RYrar o" "Tie FNIn
CmDT ADMwisT.RAox (1940) 51-58.
62. See EIGHTa ANNUAL REPORT OF TUE FARMs CREDIT kDMIN1STITIrN (1940) app.,
tab. 22. The land banks have adopted a number of other palliatives to relieve the strain
on borrowers. If the delinquency is only temporary, the bank may simply forbear cd-
lection or grant a formal extension of the delinquent item; re.mortizations of loans are
also being effected, and where the borrower is indebted to both the land bank and the
mortgage corporation, the latter may agree to make no demand for principal or interest
for a period of five years. Under a lease-option arrangement adopted by some of the
land banks, former owners are allowed to lease ana repurchase their farms. This pro-
cedure, however, is not mandatory, and in 1940 only (41) farms %%ere thus sold by the
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation to former owners. See id. at 54-58; Hcarings on
S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 207-10.
63. See Corey, A Straight Lane to Socialism (June, 1940) 28 NTI'S Busi.,.Ess
15, 17. For a summary of these organizations and their function, see 1 C. C. H. 1941
Fed. Admin. Proc. at p. 13145.
64. These loans were not to exceed $7,500 to any one farmer, or 75% of the nor-
mal or prudent investment value of the farm property. 4. STAr. 48 (1933) as ameinded,
48 STAT. 347 (1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1016(b) (1940).
65. 48 STAT. 345 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 1020c (19140). The notes and mortgages
which had already been taken by the Commission w ere, by the Federal Farm Mortgage
Act, expressly transferred to the Corporation. Ibid., 12 U. S. C. at § 1020b.
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to the estimated extent of $265,000,000 between May 1933 and January
1936. 6 Although these financial subsidies were helpful in ameliorating the
severity of the crisis, they served at the same time to postpone a frontal
attack on the basic problem of establishing a permanently satisfactory credit
system.
Farm Bankruptcy Legislation. Further to ease the strain on overburdened
borrowers, legislation designed to expand the scope of the bankruptcy laws
was adopted in the 1933-35 period. 7 The 1933 attempt,08 calculated to
facilitate extensions and compositions of farmer indebtedness, proved inef-
fectual, for success of the proposals depended upon the consent of a majority
of creditors holding a majority of claims, thereby giving the first mortgagee
an absolute veto over the readjustments.'9 The coercive effect of Section
75(s), 70 added in 1934, was sufficient to bring about many voluntary com-
positions, but was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.7 In
1935, Section 75(s) was reenacted in altered form 2 and subsequently de-
clared constitutional.73 The only real effect of the new procedure, however,
is to give the borrower a three-year moratorium. At the end of that period
he stands to lose his farm unless he can refinance himself in the interim.74
Adoption of more liberal bankruptcy laws is at best a temporizing gesture.
Numerically, the class of debtors who can use the laws to good effect is not
significant. From 1934 to 1939, the average number of cases concluded under
66. See WOODRUFF, FAR-At MORTGAGE LOANS OF LIFE INSURANCM COMPANIES (1937)
155.
67. See Hanna, Agricultural Compositions and Extensions Under the Bankruptcy
Act (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 9; Hanna, New Frazier-Lenke Act (1936) 1 Mo. L. MV. 1;
Roberts, Property, Mortgaged Land and the Frazier-Lemke Act (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv,
291; Wood and Ackerson, Federal Farm Credit and Bankruptcy Laws of 1934 (1935)
21 A. B. A. J. 79; Comments, Constitutionality of the Frazier-Lenike Act (1935) 44 YALE,
L. J. 651, Judicial Barriers to Farm Debt Relief (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 859.
68. Section 75 of the NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY Acr, 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), 11 U. S. C.
§ 203 (1940).
69. See authorities cited supra note 67, and Garrison, The New Bankruptcy Amend-
ments: Some Problems of Construction (1933) 8 Wis. L. REv. 291.
70. 48 STAT. 1289 (1934).
71. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935), 35 CoL,.
L. REv. 1136.
72. 49 STAT. 943-45 (1935), 11 U. S. C. §203(s) (1940).
73. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440 (1937), 37
COL L. REv. 1005, 32 ILL. L. REV. 239.
74. Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180 (1939), petitions under Section 75(s) were
often dismissed at the commencement of proceedings on the ground that the debtor had
no reasonable hope for rehabilitation within the three-year stay allowed under the sec-
tion. For a collection of these cases see Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust
Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 462, 463 (1937). The Bartels case held that it was error to dismiss
a debtor's petition on such grounds. However, the practical difficulties of refinancing
within three years are still present. See Steinbergli, The Fravier-Lelnke Decision (1937)
13 J. LAND. & P. U. ECON. 208.
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Section 75 without a declaration of bankruptcy was less than 3300,75 and in
1938-39 only slightly more than 200 cases were disposed of tinder Section
75(s). 7'3 When contrasted with the two and a third millions of farms under
mortgage,77 the limited degree to which these bankruptcy laws are used is
readily apparent. Some increase in their use may be anticipated from the
decision in Vright v. Union Central Life Insurance Cowpany, -8 in which
the mortgagor won the right under Section 75(s) to redeem his farm at
its appraised value before a creditor could force a public sale. While this
decision makes possible an effective procedure for scaling down mortgage
indebtedness, Section 75 nevertheless remains subject to two weaknesses
shared by all such bankruptcy laws: faulty appraisal methods may prevent
the necessary deflation of mortgage indebtedness, and adequate measures for
refinancing of the debtor are lacking.70 Because of these weaknesses, farmers
at the end of their moratorium respite remain unable to take advantage
of the opportunity to repurchase or to shake off the burden of inflated in-
debtedness. Frequently, moreover, efforts to collect sufficient funds f.r
repurchase result in overproduction and depletion of soil, so that the creditor
loses in the bargain.
POSSIBILITIEs FOR REVISION OF THE LoNG-TER1M CREDIT SYSTEm
Appraisal and Lending Policies. Fundamentals of a satisfactory credit
system are correct appraisal methods and lending policies. The two are
mutually dependent, for errors in one may weaken the effectiveness of the
other. Thus, the existing conservative policy of lending only up to 50%
of the value of the farm and 20% of the value of the permanent insured1
improvements has frequently been counteracted by errors of appraisal. If
75. See Statistics from REP. ATr'- GE,. (1934-39). The number of cases by years
is as follows: 1934-349; 1935-5962; 1936-5285; 1937-201"5; 1033-27715; 1939-
2649. For further evidence of the limited use by farm debtors of Section 75 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, see Hanna, supra note 67, 1 Mo. L. REv. at 18; Comment, A Su ,r0y of
Sections 74 and 75 of the Bankrupty Act in .lctal Operation (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1235.
76. See REP. AT'T'Y GEN. (1938-39) tab. 3C. In 1038. 124 cawes were dispoed fif
under this section; in 1939, 103 cases were so handled.
77. See THE WORLD ALAMAC (1941) 604.
78. 311 U. S. 273 (1940), (1941) 35 ILL L. REv. 878, S U or Cm. L, Rrx. 539.
The case involved the petition of a secured creditor, filed pursuant to the eo,nd pr,,vi¢,4
of Section 75(s) (3), asking for an immediate sale and alleging inter alia that the
debtor was hopelessly insolvent. The debtor filed a cross petition under the firqt
proviso of Section 75(s) (3) asking for a reappraisal of the land and fo.r the privikge
of redeeming at the reappraised value. Although previous decisions had indicated that
an unqualified right to a public sale was a necessary creditor safeguard [Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Moun-
tain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440 (1937)], the Supreme Court held that the debtr mu~t
first be given the opportunity to redeem.
79. See Steinbergh, supra note 74, at 210.
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these errors are not to be repeated in the ensuing era of rising prices and
farm values, a redetermination of appraisal methods is in order.
The basic principle of sound farm credit is that mortgage indebtedness
must not exceed the debt-carrying capacity of the farm.80 It is the function
of an appraisal to determine this capacity. While some indication is given
by the normal value of the farm or its recovery value or its market value,
the direct and appropriate attack on the problem is through an analysis of
farm. income available for debt payments. The Farm Security Administra-
tion has successfully used this technique in administering its Tenant Purchase
Program.8 ' Loans are made tip to the capitalized value of the net farm
income. 2 A margin of error is allowed by capitalizing the net income at
a slightly higher percentage than is actually required to pay interest and
retire the loan within a given period.8 3 No appraisal scheme can eliminate
errors of judgment, but this method has the merit of focusing attention upon
the definitive factor-the income of the farmer which may be used to pay
interest and principal on his debt. In determining what this income actually
is, questions of whether to base calculations upon AAA payments and
acreage restrictions, 8 4 what price levels to use in calculating prospective farm
income, how much weight to give to personal characteristics of the borrower,
and kindred problems will inevitably arise and errors may be made. The
solution is to work toward greater precision in analysis. It is no answer
to these problems to turn from income analysis to calculation of the normal
value of the farm as determined by a vastly more complex series of indices.
The use of the earning capacity standard of valuation would obviate con-
siderations of the ratio which the loan should bear to the value of the farm
80. See YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 752-54.
81. Authority for this program is contained in the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act of 1937. 50 STAT. 522 (1937), 7 U. S. C. §§ 1000-06 (1940). In three years of
operation from 1937 to 1939, 12,234 tenant-purchase loans averaging $5,721, were made.
The popularity of the program is demonstrated by the fact that more than 20 applications
have been filed for every loan which it has been possible to make. See REPoRT oV Tr"
ADMINISTILTOR OF THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (1940) 12-13; YARDoOi' oF
AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1940) 898-901. For an explanation of the appraisal
method used, see Tenant Purchase Appraisal Bulletin No. 1 (U. S. Farm Sec. Adm'n,
1941).
82. The net income is calculated by determining gross income expected from sales
of crops and livestock under typical management based on the present ability of the
farm to produce; from this gross income are deducted estimated expenses, including
operating costs, depreciation on equipment, maintenance of buildings, taxes and insur-
ance, estimated cash family living expense, and interest on operating capital. See Tenant
Purchase Appraisal Bulletin No. 1 (U. S. Farm Sec. Adm'n, 1941) 5-8.
83. See id. at 6.
84. In determining earning capacity under the Tenant Purchase Program, AAA
acreage restrictions are uniformly used, but the question of whether to credit AAA
payments is left to regional discretion because of differing conditions throughout the
country. See id. at 9.
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as collateral security.8 5 It would eliminate the distinction which now exists
between land bank loans and Land Bank Commissioner loans as the result
of different collateral requirements, and a single credit agency could ad-
minister the loans on a uniform basis.80
The Wheeler-jones Bill of 194087 and the current Bankliead-Fulmer Bil s
both directed toward a solution of farm credit problems, indicate that con-
flicting opinion on appraisal persists. The strength of the Wheeler Bill lies
in its break with methods used in the past and its support of the earning
capacity standard of valuation. The pending Bankhead-Fulmer Bill, however,
reaffirms the traditional valuation standards which have resulted in the
excessive mortgage indebtedness and insecurity of tenure now extant.
Refinancing and Scale-down of Excessive Mortgate Indebtedness. Any
revision of the long-term credit system must provide means for a scale-down
of present inflated mortgage indebtedness, and for refinancing of the bor-
rower. It is important that mortgagees recognize and write off their losses
promptly, instead of waiting until farms have deteriorated and the soil has
been mined in a futile effort on the part of the farm-debtor to carry nut
the mortgage contract.8" Bankruptcy and moratorium laws designed to reduce
excessive indebtedness or postpone the reckoning have demonstrated their
inadequacy when unaccompanied by provisions for refinancing of the bor-
rower.90 Recognizing this, the Wheeler and Fulmer Bills combine a method
of debt-adjustment with a program of refinancing of the delinquent borrower.
They provide first for a determination by a debt-adjustment committee that
the mortgage indebtedness is greater than the value of the farm. If this is
established, the mortgagor may convey title to the land bank or the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation; they in turn will release him from his mort-
gage obligations and permit him under a five-year lease to remain on the
property and continue to farm. At the termination of the lease, he may re-
purchase the property at its appraised value and enter into a repurchase
mortgage with the land bank.
However promising these proposals, they raise many problems. Selection
of the debt-adjustment committee is of considerable importance. The com-
mittee should be experienced in farm mortgage problems and free from the
influence of interested parties. While both bills rely heavily upon the national
85. 0,ith such factors as sale value, replacements costs, and per-acre values elim-
inated from the appraisal scheme, conceptions of "50% of the value of the land" and
"20% of the value of the improvements" become obsolete.
86. The extent to which these two lending procedures are identical is indicated in
1 C. C. H. 1941 FED. ADMIN. PROC. at p. 13,185.
87. S.3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) H. RL 8748, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
88. S. 1797, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H. R. 5336, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
89. See Hearings before Comnmitee on Agriculture on H. R. 87,18, 76th cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) 255.
90. See mtpra p. 658-59.
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farm loan associations for this function, it would seem that the conciliation
commissioners who administer Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act might well
be used. By this technique it would be possible to coordinate Frazier-Lemke
bankruptcy proceedings with debt-adjustment and refinancing under the pro-
posed legislation.' This in itself would effect a needed simplification of
procedures for distressed farmers.
More significant is the question of determining whether the mortgage in-
debtedness is greater than the value of the farm. The Wheeler Bill permits
an adjustment of indebtedness if the farm-debtor establishes that his in-
debtedness is in excess of the productive value of the mortgaged farm or that
the payments due on such indebtedness exceed the normal farm income avail-
able for such payments. Such a standard is far more constructive than that
of the Fulmer Bill which states only that a farm-debtor will be entitled to
an adjustment if he establishes that his indebtedness is greater than the
value of his farm, without specifying how the farm value is to be determined.
The standard of valuation sponsored in the Wheeler-Jones Bill is one which
would have the desired effect of bringing mortgage indebtedness into line
with the debt carrying capacity of the farm. The Bankhead-Fulmer Bill
lacks both clarity and directness in this respect.
In the debt-adjustment procedure whereby the farm is conveyed to the
land bank in exchange for a release of all mortgage indebtedness, the right,-
of third-party lienholders must be preserved. This is done in the Wheeler
and Fulmer Bills by authorizing the land bank or the Federal Farm Mort-
gage Corporation to assume the liens in exchange for bonds or cash before
debt-adjustment takes place. While this procedure would obviate the legal
problems arising from possible infringement of creditor interests, it would
seem to be an unnecessary gratuity to the lienholders in the light of the
Wright case,9 2 which gives the debtor's redemption privilege priority over
the creditor's right to a public sale. 93 This decision would seem to permit
an evaluation of the farm property and all liens thereon by the debt-adjust-
ment committee, after proper hearing of all parties. If the third-party lien
is not superior to the land bank mortgage, and if the value of the property
is less than the land bank mortgage, the third party would have no equity
to be infringed, and would therefore suffer no injury by a write-off of the
farmer's indebtedness. If his lien is superior to that of the land bank, a
tender of the appraised value of the lien by the land bank to the lienholder
should be sufficient to comply with the rights of the creditor as outlined in
the Wright case.
91. It would be necessary in any event to provide for a stay in Frazier-Lenike
proceedings while debt-adjustnient and refinancing under the proposed legislatiotn were
taking place.
92. 311 U.,S. 273 (1940).
93. See note 78 supra.
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Any satisfactory debt-adjustment program must be coupled with refinan-
cing provisions for the debtor. Proper refinancing controls, moreover, call
be used to correlate the credit system with other agricultural program-, in
operation. 4 Thus, wastage clauses included in repurchase mortgages should
be broad enough to require the adoption of conservation practices. " 5 If the
farm is too small to constitute an efficient productive unit, ur if additional
improvements are needed to enable a diligent family to operate the farm
successfully, refinancing arrangements should provide for the e adjustment.
in size and equipment. " " This technique has been effectively used in the unit-
reorganization loans of the Farm Security Administration. 7 Credit contrf-ols
may also be used to secure proper land-use adjustments.9 The production
goals set by the Department of Agriculture for the ensuing earn call for
increased production of certain commodities and for stable or decreasing
yields of others. 9 Credit extension can be directed toward the achievement
of these goals by discouraging increased farmer indebtedness for the pru-
duction of non-essential commodities, and by making credit available fur
changes in farm operations which will permit more complete cooperation
with the program outlined. These techniques, combined with refinancing at
low interest rates, and amortization of the loan over a loung period of time,
will do much to secure the stability of tenure which is a perertquisite to
intelligent farm management and long-range planning.1 00
Elimination of the Stock Subscription Rcquircment.l1  The fanner is the
only borrower who is forced to become a stockholder in the lending institu-
94. The importance of coordinating the credit system with tAIl o.nser~at, proj~d-
land-use adjustments and other agricultural programs is indicated Joy tiv redt,, -lhip
between mortgage foreclosures and such factors as svil fertility, tVFV of lid, and u-V
of conservation practices. See HA.NDaouK OF EcoINoMIC II, 'ATit., o.N (.1. L U-J l. td
FAi-'m CREDIT (U. S. Farm Credit Adm'n) 7--.
95. See Johnson, Farm-Credit Policy as a Factor in Suil Cnsczatizma (1939) 15 J.
LAND & P. U. Ecoi,. 377, 380.
96. See YEARo0K OF AGRICULTURE (U. S. Dept A.gric. l'140) 409.
97. See id. at 896.
98. See Johnson, loc. cit. supra note 95.
99. Increases in the products of dairy cows, h'gs, and chich-ns are c,,ntlnllatl,1,
with possible decreases in oats, wheat, cvtton, and tbacco. For a dihcuscsitn cof t
national goals for 1942, see 25 THE AGRICULTC.PIUL SITU.TION (Bur. of Agrie. F '.,n,
U. S. Dep't Agric., Nov., 1941) 2.
100. Because of its indestructability and the certainty of livrpMual demawl io.r it,
products, the price of land is high in relation to its earning , Toj uAld: th.,
borrower to repay the loan, low interest rates and long-term an-,rtizati",n are a 1cc i-
101. The Wheeler-Jones Bill advocated complete abandinm int ,,f tIis rc.uirnio.t.
but the Bankhead-Fulmer Bill has attempted to work out a c-mprnlisev measure xihcr,i,%
instead of the 5% stock subscription, a membership fee of 25, of the b,rr -ers l,,m
would be charged. On a doctrinal level, it w,,uld seem that the oljecti-us t,# the
existing stock subscription requirement are equally valid when applied ts such a cnem-
bership fee.
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tion as a condition of securing the loan. 10 2 The requirement has not created
the cooperative credit system which was intended; it has in fact operated
as an additional 5% commission for the loan and has thus tended to keep
the better risks out of the system. Whether the outstanding stock can be
retired without impairing bondholders' security is problematical. The seeming
intent of the Act is that this could be done, since the stock is not security
for the land bank bonds. These bonds are secured by farm mortgages and
Government bonds, 10 3 and the stock is held by the land bank only as security
for payment of the mortgage loan.10 4 It is specifically provided in Sections
7 and 8 of the Farm Loan Act, however, that the stock shall be retired upon
full payment of the loan. This means that the mortgage is worth only 95%
of its face value, and, therefore, that the bonds issued with the mortgages
as security are 5%o water. On this reasoning, retirement of the stock would
merely establish the bonds at their true worth. Courts, however, seem to
have rejected this interpretation of the Act. They have held that in case
of foreclosure of the mortgage' 0 5 or insolvency of the farm loan association
through which the loan was made' 0 6 the borrower is not entitled to a set-
off for his stock. In adopting this view, they have argued that it was the
evident purpose of the Act to make all borrowers liable for obligations of
the farm loan association up to the amount of their stock subscription. As-
suming that this argument is correct and that it justifies refusal to allow
a set-off for the stock subscription when the association is insolvent, it
provides no explanation for cases not involving the insolvency of the farm
loan association, where the only question presented is whether a set-off for
the borrower's stock should be allowed in a foreclosure proceeding. In view
of the evident confusion of the law on this point, it might be necessary to
provide for a substitution of collateral to the extent of the stock retired,
or for an outright guarantee of the land bank bonds. Either of these methods
would eliminate any question of injury to the bondholders by retirement of
the stock.
102. The requirement is customary among Government agricultural lending agencies,
such as production credit associations [48 STAT. 261 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 1131g
(1940)], and banks for cooperatives [48 STAT. 264 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 1134d (1940)].
103. Section 13 (subd. third).
104. Section 7.
105. Federal Land Bank of Beekley v. Warner, 42 Ariz. 201, 23 P. (2d) 563 (1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 292 U. S. 53 (1934). The rationale of the court was that an
essential to the right of set-off or counterclaim is that the debts be between the same
persons, and that since the borrower from a farm loan association is a stockholder
in the association and not in the land bank, no set-off was admissible. Considering the
spurious character of the farm loan associations as independent agencies, this decision
is at best one on form and not substance.
106. Knox National Farm Loan Association v. Phillips, 300 U. S. 194 (1937)
Western Clay National Farm Loan Association v. Lilly, 189 Ark. 1004, 76 S. W. (2d)
55 (1934); Byrne v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 61 N. D. 265, 237 N. W. 797
(1931).
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Guarantee of Land Bank Bonds. 07 Land bank bonds backed by a straight
Government guarantee could be issued with staggered maturities at an aver-
age rate of interest of approximately 27o,108 contrasted with the present
rates of from 3% to 4% for unguaranteed bonds. It is necessary to stagger the
maturities, since long-term loans cannot safely be made when loan funds
are obtained only on a short-term basis. If 1 of each loan were charged
for administrative expenses and losses, a figure which should be adequate
on the basis of past experience, 0 9 the land bank could make long-term loans
for approximately 3y2 %. This is the rate now paid by borrowers, but the
guarantee would make it possible to discontinue the $36,500,000 annual
interest subsidy at present required to maintain it. By fixing the loan rate
at the cost of money to the land bank, plus 15_- ' for expenses, the system
would be self-sustaining, and the loan rate would automatically reflect changes
in the cost of money. Moreover, the use of the bond guarantee would make
possible a gradual liquidation of the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation.
Its function in the past has been to purchase unguaranteed land bank bonds
and to sell its own guaranteed bonds on the open market.110 This circuitous
arrangement by which the land banks obtained funds would be unnecessary,
and the Mortgage Corporation could gradually liquidate as its bonds were
called in. The liquidation would accomplish a needed simplification of credit
agencies. Land Bank Commissioner loans now made by the Corporation
are in all essentials similar to those of the land banks, and in fact the land
bank organization is used in making them."' This fact militates strongly
in favor of establishing the land banks as a unified governmental agency for
handling all long-term loans to agriculture.
107. An outright guarantee of the bonds was proposed in the \heeler-jones Bill;
the Bankhead-Fulmer Bill merely authorizes the Federal Farm Mortgage Corlsiration t.)
purchase the bonds whenever the interest rate exceeds by more than Y.j of 1% the
rate on Corporation bonds. This presents the same type of bo'nus to investrs which
has operated in the past. See supra p. 654-55.
108. See Hearings before Comnmittce on Agriculture on H. R. 674S, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940) 132, 141.
109. During 23 years of existence, the expense of operation was .54% of each loan,
losses, .27c, estimated losses and reserves for losses, .2,W, a total of 1.094c. Sce
Hearings on S. 3509, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 211. The actual margin between loan
rates and bond rates has been 1.56% including reserves for losses not yet realized, and
undivided profits. See id. at 15.
110. See note 50 supra.
111. See I C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Admin. Proc. at p. 13,185.
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